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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      AVNER MALOUL and ALLEN LOWY,
                     Plaintiffs,
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                                                07 Civ. 8525
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                 v.
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      IVAN BERKOWITZ, GREAT COURT
      CAPITAL, LLC, SD PARTNERS, LLC,
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      UTIX GROUOP, INC.,
      VSUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
 8
      and SUNSET BRANDS, INC.,
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                     Defendants.
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11
                                                January 3, 2008
                                                2:15 p.m.
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      Before:
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                            HON. LEONARD B. SAND
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      MORGENSTERN JACOBS & BLUE, LLC
           Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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      BY: ERIC B. FISHER
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      GERSTEN SAVAGE LLP
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          Attorneys for Defendants
      BY: STEVEN R. POPOFSKY
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(Case called)

(In open court)

THE COURT: You may be seated. Who speaks for the movant?

MR. POPOFSKY: Steven Popofsky from Gersten Savage

THE COURT: I will hear you.

MR. POPOFSKY: Thank you. Your Honor, there are I think three things at issue on this motion. Puffing, I'm going to pass by unless you have any questions. I think there are certain types of representations that are not actionable, they're not actionable without the need for discovery or summary judgment, Bonanza, those types of things. I think I will leave it to the papers on that.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. POPOFSKY: I think the more complicated question, although still I think dispositive, is the question of a couple of more factual representations that I say needed to be verified and weren't.

There is a principle of law -- and the plaintiffs don't dispute the principle -- that if a plaintiff has the means to verify a representation and chooses not to do it, he or she can't complain that they were defrauded into whatever they did.

THE COURT: Let's talk about that for a moment. In

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the classic cases, the victim, the plaintiff, is told something like you should invest in this company because they're about to acquire something or they get a patent or do something. Right? The investor is told that somebody else is going to do something, or has something, some attribute or event which is going to cause the investment to be of great value. And the courts show very little sympathy towards the victim who doesn't investigate that.

Now, this is a different situation, because the representation which was allegedly made is not about what somebody else was going to do but something that the defendant said he had done or was going to do, invest an equal share of his own money in the company.

MR. POPOFSKY: I think there are two representations in this complaint that fall in that category. Your Honor stated one. The other one is that there were personal guarantees by the principals of the issuers. I think that does fall --

THE COURT: Well, that comes in the first one.

MR. POPOFSKY: Yes.

THE COURT: But how about the representation by somebody who is thought of as being a friend who says I have or I will --

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MR. POPOFSKY: I have.

THE COURT: -- I have invested a like sum of money in

the company?

MR. POPOFSKY: On the same terms and conditions.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. POPOFSKY: I don't see a material --

THE COURT: How do you verify that? When your friend tells you this is what I have done --

MR. POPOFSKY: That's very simple. I think that's a simple answer, your Honor. You ask either the person who is telling you, or the company, to see the documentation of the investment. The same thing that you have done, the same thing that you may be expecting to receive, you ask to see something that he has done. I think that's an easy request to make, it's an easy thing to see. If someone has in fact invested \$100,000 or \$700,000 over 18 months on four separate occasions, and someone is telling you he has done the same thing, it's easy to say let me see some verification of that -- if he cares.

THE COURT: And the answer you get is "Don't you trust me? I'm your friend." Right?

MR. POPOFSKY: Well, that's not what's alleged here. What's alleged here -- the difference, your Honor -- I don't know if it's a difference -- but I think the key thing is that the plaintiffs in this complaint not only admit but they proudly proclaim that they did nothing, they asked no questions.

THE COURT: Because they relied on the good faith and

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integrity of their friend.

MR. POPOFSKY: That's correct. And what would be the point of the principle of law that if you have the means to verify you must make use of them if you can just say I could have easily found this out but I relied on my friend? And they didn't just rely once, your Honor. And I think that's important here. This is four separate investments, according to the complaint, four separate investments over 18 months. So, every five months or so all of this is alleged to have happened again. If they really were interested, if they really cared about whether Mr. Berkowitz was coinvesting --

THE COURT: They were interested enough to put in the money, right? This is not --

MR. POPOFSKY: Well, they were blindly doing, according to them, whatever they were asked to do. They claim that he had made money for them in the past, so they were just sending money. But what I'm suggesting is I don't think they were really interested in whether he was coinvesting or not.

But if they were --

THE COURT: This is a motion to dismiss a complaint.

What basis do they have for saying that they didn't care? This one said, hey, I have done work for you in the past, here is another opportunity and I am putting in X dollars; do you want to put in that amount of money also?

MR. POPOFSKY: And then they do it, and then six

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months later they do it again, and then six months later they do it again, and all during that time they never asked to see. If that was important to them, they should have asked to see some verification somewhere along the line. They also had a lawyer.

THE COURT: Let's assume for the moment -- it's a motion to dismiss a complaint, and I have to assume the facts as alleged in the complaint. Why would the defendant have said that to the plaintiffs other than to induce them to make the investment?

MR. POPOFSKY: No, that would be why he would -- yes, we are assuming the truth. That's why he would say it. But the law requires of plaintiffs some minimal level of due diligence. The cases clearly state that.

THE COURT: Well, do you have a case in which the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was an ongoing one, categorized by the plaintiff as being a friend, in which the alleged misrepresentation is of something which the defendant had done, not something that was happening to the company or some third party? I your friend am telling you that I am putting in X thousand dollars, do you want to put it in also?

MR. POPOFSKY: Well, first of all, we're not talking about an allegation of any fiduciary relationship. And the allegation in the complaint is not that they were friends; it's

that he said as your friend I'm telling you this. No, I don't believe I have a case that specifically says that someone who characterized himself as a friend said it, but I don't think the case law is so limited.

THE COURT: Do you have a case in which the misrepresentation is with respect to something that the defendant said he had done?

MR. POPOFSKY: I'm not sure, your Honor. I would have to look, because until you raised that as a distinction -- it was not raised in the opposing brief, and it's not a distinction that I had thought about. I would have to look.

THE COURT: I will give you an opportunity to think about it, because I haven't either.

It occurred to me, however, that in a way people deal with each other there may be -- and I am not at all adamant about this -- when somebody in a professional context says that he has done something, he has done something which makes you eager to get on the same band wagon, and he had not done it, I'm not aware of any case.

MR. POPOFSKY: I understand that point. I just don't see why that's a legal principle distinction that would be an exception to the general rule. Why would that be an exception? If it's--

THE COURT: I think it might be an exception to the general rule, because one would hope that the law at least

takes into consideration the way people normally act with each other. And if this was an instance in which somebody said, you know, X corporation is about to be given a patent on a cancer cure, that's something where one might expect inquiry. But if somebody with whom you have dealt with in the past before says I tell you what I have done, I have taken X thousand dollars of my money, and I have put it in this business, and you can come in on the same terms --

MR. POPOFSKY: Well, I have three points on that. One is I don't know that your cancer drug analogy, or any of those, is actually -- to me those seem perhaps weaker, because that's a question of inquiry. Your Honor used the word inquiry, but my motion is not based on inquiry, it's based on verification. I think there is a difference between inquiry and verification.

If someone says we have a cancer drug that's about to be approved, you could inquire or you could look into what stage of approval it's in, but you can't really know if it's going to be approved or not. That's not something that you can actually verify as a fact.

THE COURT: What's the best, strongest evidence of whether somebody has or has not done something? Isn't it whether he says this is what I've done?

MR. POPOFSKY: No, no, the best evidence is a piece of paper showing it. If someone has invested, it would be easy enough to see the check or the investment document. It depends

on the nature of the investment, but there is always a piece of paper. And here there would have been at least four pieces of paper. So, I think it's easier than in your examples of what other people have done, I think it's easier to verify. When someone says to you I have done this, it's real easy to say, OK, show me, show me something that indicates that you did it.

And respectfully I would turn your case question around, because we are talking I think about an exception to the general rule. I would say that plaintiff, if plaintiff is going to adopt your Honor's argument and argue this distinction, then plaintiff ought to come up with a case that says something the defendant is alleged to have done is an exception to the general rule, because we have a general rule.

THE COURT: Except you are the movant, you have the burden.

MR. POPOFSKY: I do. But I have a general rule that's been the law in New York for at least 120 years. There is scores of cases that cite the general rule and apply it in all sorts of different circumstances. As we say, I don't know if there is a specific case in this circumstance, but I know the general rule, and I think it fits this type of situation. It's an easy thing to verify, and it went on --

THE COURT: How do you verify? He says I bought X number of shares with my own money. You call up the corporation and say --

MR. POPOFSKY: Or you could ask him, show me your check, the simplest thing. Show me a check or some documentation of your investment. Everybody has documentation of an investment. You don't give \$700,000 without getting something back.

Now, these plaintiffs didn't ask for anything ahead of time, but I think in Mr. Fisher's brief he says they received some papers afterwards. It's not in the complaint, but he says it would make sense if you are getting notes — the allegations are that they got promissory notes, so you would have something. It would be easy enough. They have a promissory note to Maloul and Lowy, so can we see a promissory note to Berkowitz? Or can we see your check? Something.

THE COURT: Hindsight makes us all wise.

MR. POPOFSKY: And my third point is I don't think I'm arguing against the way people normally act. I think this general rule does consider the way people normally act. And I agree that if somebody says to you I'm doing this, that's an inducement. There is no question that that's an inducement. The question is whether there is some minimal level of verification required. And I don't think it's at odds with how people normally act.

People are induced, but the law also holds some people to some minimal level of verification. And that's what they should have done. And, again, that's why the 18 months and the

four separate occasions I think is significant. I think it might be easier --

THE COURT: Is there anything in that period of time which should have alerted the plaintiffs to the fact that something was wrong?

MR. POPOFSKY: Yes. They allege that each time -- let me find it. I will find the paragraph. They allege that each time they were told money wasn't coming in and they needed to invest more money in order to protect their investment. And they had a lawyer who they claim they thought was their lawyer. They were sending money to a lawyer, and they claim that they thought he was their lawyer.

THE COURT: Acting sort of as an escrow agent?

MR. POPOFSKY: That's the allegation. So if that
happened, then on several occasions over 18 months they weren't
getting what they thought; they were told to put more in. They
could have gone to him. They could have gone to the three
different issuers. They could have gone to the lawyer, who
they thought was their own lawyer, and say what's going on
here.

The paragraph I was talking about is paragraph 39.

They said shortly before payments were due to plaintiffs

pursuant to the purported terms of the investments, plaintiffs

would receive word from the issuer defendants that the payments

could not be made on time, offering a higher rate of interest

and the opportunity to purchase more stock.

So, in answer to your question, yes, I think things did occur over the 18 months that put them on notice, and they willfully shut their eyes over 18 months. They didn't care about anything. They were just sending money blindly. I think the law requires a minimal level above that.

We are not talking about the extent of due diligence. That's what his brief talked about, and I understand completely on a motion to dismiss you can't get into was the due diligence adequate. But their complaint very clearly states -- and I have quoted from it a couple of times in my reply brief -- we relied solely, we asked for no documents, we saw no documents. That I think you can hold as a matter of law is insufficient. So, that's my argument on the verification.

I'd like to address 9(b) if I could as well briefly.
THE COURT: OK.

MR. POPOFSKY: There are purposes to 9(b) other than the ones cited by the plaintiffs' counsel in his brief. One of the purposes of 9(b) is to dispose of spurious fraud claims at an early stage, that people can't just hurl fraud allegations around without being forced to some specifics. And here there are some incredibly easy questions to be answered that they don't answer.

THE COURT: You're absolutely right, that the complaint is woefully lacking in facts which have to be

available to the plaintiffs to counter, the approximate dates of these several transactions and so on.

MR. POPOFSKY: Well, your Honor, then I think I won't say anything more on that.

THE COURT: Well, you do say something else. You say but the plaintiff hasn't asked for leave to amend the complaint and, therefore, but...

MR. POPOFSKY: I think they made a choice in responding, your Honor. They chose to defend the validity of this pleading, and they said all we have to do is say who made the representations and they understand what we're claiming and that's good enough. So I think you should hold them to their choice. I think it would be improper to let them have it both ways. They defend the pleading and now presumably say we would like an opportunity to amend. I think they had an opportunity to ask for it.

THE COURT: After you educated them on some of the deficiencies. That's always the risk in making motions at this stage.

MR. POPOFSKY: You are the judge, your Honor, and I can't argue with you on that. So, unless you have any other questions...

THE COURT: No.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, Eric Fisher from Morgenstern Jacobs & Blue for the plaintiffs. I'd like to start with the

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verification point made by my adversary.

I think that your Honor's focus on Mr. Berkowitz's representation that he was coinvesting along with the plaintiffs is of critical significance because I think it frames the context for the whole fraud here.

My clients were not relating to Mr. Berkowitz as they would to a broker or as they would to some third party who was promoting an investment to them. They were relating to him, as your Honor indicated, as someone with whom they had a relationship that went back to the 1980s, who had made recommendations to them in the past, and in whom they put a certain amount of trust; and they were under the impression that they were acting as a group in investing with

Mr. Berkowitz. And I think that in that context, the relative lack of insistence on seeing paper verification of various factual representations that were being made to them by

Mr. Berkowitz becomes clear, because they were not relating to him as they would to a broker in which they said, well, let's see some documents about that.

When Mr. Berkowitz said that he was investing according to the same terms and conditions, and then proceeded to lay out a series of facts that he thought made the investment, or he claimed made the investment attractive, they took him at his word. And, of course, the question of the extent of due diligence is inherently variable and fact

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specific, and discovery ultimately will show that under the circumstances of this relationship the plaintiffs' behavior was reasonable. But that's not an issue for the motion to dismiss.

And in terms of your Honor's question about whether there are cases in which individuals relied on someone's recommendations as a friend, and statements about acts that that person was taking, I haven't seen cases exactly on point, your Honor, but I do know that all of the due diligence cases cited by my adversary involve investors who were standing in some kind of arms-length relationship to the person making representations to them, and that was not the case here. This is really a simple fraudulent inducement case.

With regard to the puffing issue, which Mr. Popofsky just really rested on his papers, I think it's absolutely clear that most of the allegations of misrepresentations in the complaint relate to statements of fact.

For me perhaps the most glaring omission by

Mr. Berkowitz is the failure to disclose that he was receiving

fees from these issuer defendants. And, again, getting back to

the earlier point, if Mr. Berkowitz were receiving fees and my

clients knew that, then that would put them in a situation

where they might want to ask follow-up questions of

Mr. Berkowitz, because they would know that he had some vested

interest in soliciting their money. But they had no idea of

that. And clearly the fact that he was receiving fees and

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didn't disclose that is an omission of fact. Similarly, his representation that these loans were personally guaranteed, something which turned out not to be true, it's clearly a statement of fact. So, I think that there are many material misstatements of fact that are specified in the complaint.

In terms of the 9(b) point about which your Honor expressed concerns, the complaint identifies fraudulent statements, it explains why those statements were fraudulent, it explains that in every instance Mr. Berkowitz was the speaker, and it alleges in a general way that those statements were made at or shortly before the time that the investments were made, and it specifies the month and year of each investment. What it does not allege is whether those statements were made in face-to-face meetings -- some of them were -- whether they were made by telephone call -- some of them were. But aside from that level of granularity in the detail, I do think the allegations are certainly specific enough to put Mr. Berkowitz on notice of what this case is all about, to allow him to prepare a defense, and with enough specificity that it should be clear to the court that this is not some effort to drag Mr. Berkowitz's name through the mud but it is a complaint that is really grounded in fairly specific factual allegations.

THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to renewal. I am going to

direct that the plaintiff file an amended complaint with as much specificity as you can. What you do is you say three transactions and this happened in all three. Well, use some more paper and indicate to the extent you can the approximate dates, if you don't have the exact dates; who was present when the things were said; and whatever other detail you can furnish as to the who, what, when and where.

I'm going to allow the defendant to renew the motion addressed to the amended complaint, and also I allow both parties to deal with the question that I started out with, and that is what type of diligence is required in the context of the relationship which existed as alleged here and where the representations are something which the defendant said he did -- not that he knew of or heard of or was told -- but something that he did; and of course the omission of what he did not say, which would have of course changed the nature of the relationship as perceived by the plaintiffs and made more relevant the classic cases that the defendant relies on where somebody has the opportunity to read the prospectus or make inquiry.

Tell me how much time you require to do any of those things. The amended complaint, within three weeks?

MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Plaintiff to amend the complaint within three weeks. Defendant may renew the motion --

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April 25th.

MR. POPOFSKY: 30 days, your Honor? 1 2 THE COURT: -- within 30 days. MR. POPOFSKY: Thereafter. 3 THE COURT: 30 days after receipt of amended 4 5 complaint. Both parties to file supplemental briefs within -- let 6 7 me give you a specific date -- amended complaint within three 8 weeks, I quess by January 24th. Defendant may renew motion 9 within 30 days after the receipt of the amended complaint, 10 which would be February 25. Both parties to file supplemental 11 briefs on March 18. 12 MR. POPOFSKY: I'm not sure, your Honor, if I renew 13 the motion on the 25th, then wouldn't the next step be for the plaintiff to respond, rather than both sides? 14 It seems to me I would file the motion on the 25th 15 with my brief, he would respond the 18th, and then could I have 16 17 ten days to reply? THE COURT: Do you really need that? Do you really 18 19 need the reply briefs? I mean I don't care, but, yes, do you 20 want to do that? 2.1 MR. POPOFSKY: Yes, your Honor. All right. Defendant will renew motion 22 THE COURT: within 30 days; the plaintiff has 30 days to respond. 23 takes us to March 25. Both parties file supplemental briefs by 24

I will take it on submission. I don't think there

is any need for further oral argument.

MR. POPOFSKY: I am just confused, your Honor, when you say both parties. Is it not sequential?

THE COURT: No. What do you mean sequential?

MR. POPOFSKY: Your Honor, I'm not understanding. If I make a motion, I submit a brief.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. POPOFSKY: Then if he responds, he submits a brief.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. POPOFSKY: So then if I reply it's my reply. It' not supplemental from both of us, is it? He has already responded. I am just confused at to what you are ordering or authorizing.

THE COURT: I think it's two issues. One is the adequacy of the complaint as a matter of pleading, and the other is the legal issue of whether in the context of a relationship alleged by the plaintiffs, where the representations allegedly made by the defendant of things which he had done requires the same standard of vigilance that the courts have required in the cases you cited.

MR. POPOFSKY: I understand that a hundred percent. I would respectfully suggest that that be dealt with in our sets of papers rather than then with another mutual set. It just seems less workable to me, unless Mr. Fisher feels otherwise.

1	MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I think what you have ordered
2	is that the defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. FISHER: that I file my opposition.
5	THE COURT: OK.
6	MR. FISHER: and then thereafter we submit to your
7	Honor the briefs specifically addressing the question about
8	what happens when a defendant makes a representation about an
9	act that he himself has done. Is that
10	MR. POPOFSKY: It seemed to me to make more sense to
11	do it in the context of motion papers rather than a motion and
12	separate papers, but whatever your Honor wishes.
13	THE COURT: I couldn't care less. Tell me the dates
14	you would propose and the events you would propose.
15	MR. POPOFSKY: On your dates, your Honor, he amends by
16	January 24th, I make a motion to dismiss on February 25th.
17	THE COURT: Right.
18	MR. POPOFSKY: He responds on March 25th.
19	THE COURT: Right.
20	MR. POPOFSKY: And I reply April 15th.
21	THE COURT: OK. By April what?
22	MR. POPOFSKY: 15th.
23	THE COURT: OK.
24	MR. FISHER: I have no problem with that, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: OK. Very well.
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MR. POPOFSKY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, during this interim period is discovery permitted to proceed? Because we are now talking about a fairly lengthy additional briefing period on a potentially renewed motion to dismiss.

MR. POPOFSKY: Well, your Honor, there are other defendants as well, some have been served. I understand one just answered. I would argue the whole point of trying to dismiss this fraud claim is not to subject my client to that kind of burden unnecessarily.

It's not my client's fault that they put in a complaint that was, in your Honor's own words, woefully deficient in specifics on fraud, so I think waiting all of these years they could wait a couple more months.

THE COURT: Assuming that all of these deadlines are adhered to, and that there is no request for a delay, I will stay taking depositions. The question of whether to stay document discovery is another point.

MR. POPOFSKY: Document discovery in some ways, your Honor, is more burdensome than depositions.

THE COURT: Oh, I don't think in this case that would be true, but you know the case better than I do. I will stay discovery pending the completion of the schedule that we have now agreed upon. Thank you, gentlemen.

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